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Current trends in federal budgeting move us to conclude that the argument for 
implementing capital budgeting in the federal government should be revisited. It is 
clear that significant changes would have to occur in the present system if private 
sector capital budgeting methods were adopted by the DoD and other agencies of 
the federal government. However, there are examples of public organizations that 
have made this leap. The governments of New Zealand, Australia and the United 
Kingdom, as well as most of the states in the US, have adopted some private 
budgeting methods with varying degrees of success. This report explores how 
capital budgeting is practiced in the private sector, in other governments and how 
some of this could be applied in the federal government and Department of Defense. 
The report also provides a brief critique of DOD acquisition budgeting. 
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 Executive Summary 
It has been argued that the U.S. federal government and other public agencies 
should adopt “corporate” methods of budgeting to include the use of separate capital 
and operating budgets that are prevalent in the private sector. In the past, this 
argument has not made much progress, but the current trends move us to consider 
that this argument should be revisited. It is clear that significant changes would have 
to occur in the present system if private budgeting methods were adopted by the 
DoD and other federal agencies, but there are examples of public organizations that 
have made this leap, as the governments of New Zealand, Australia and the United 
Kingdom, as well as most of the states in the US, have adopted some private 
budgeting methods with varying degrees of success. This report explores how 
capital budgeting is practiced in the private sector and in other governments, and 
how some of this experience could be applied in the federal government and 
Department of Defense. The report also provides a brief critique of DOD acquisition 
budgeting. 
Keywords: budgeting, federal government budgeting, capital budgeting, acquisition 

























The ongoing replacement of Department of Defense (DoD) capital assets, as 
well as other much needed capital investments, will likely take place during a time of 
decreasing, or at least slowly growing financial resources over the long term. Some 
of this is due to the growth of entitlements, some to the size of the predicted deficit. 
Still another pressure is the long-term cost of military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
predicted by CBO to be $450 billion over the next ten years.  In addition, the 
Department of Defense is in the midst of an era of “transformation” under Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld that calls for the modernization of DoD 
warfighting doctrine, capital goods and business systems. The budgeting system 
has already been modified during Rumsfeld’s tenure (McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p. 
403-435).  Occasionally, it has been argued that the federal government and other 
public agencies should adopt “corporate” methods of budgeting to include the use of 
separate capital and operating budgets that are prevalent in the private sector. In the 
past, this argument has not made much progress, but the current trends enumerated 
above move us to consider that this argument should be revisited. It is clear that 
significant changes would have to occur in the present system if private budgeting 
methods were adopted by the DoD and other public organizations, but there are 
examples of public organizations that have made this leap, as the governments of 
New Zealand and Australia, as well as most of the states in the US have at least 
adopted some private budgeting methods with varying degrees of success.  
History Indicates Change Necessary 
From a historical dimension, Defense appears to be a declining share of the 
federal budget, set amongst a set of steadily growing accounts. From a historical 
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Not Since 1940 has Defense Been at a Lower % of GDP
 
Over the last 20 years, the Defense line again looks relatively smooth, 
although some turbulence appears. The Reagan buildup is apparent, as is some 
difference in support for Defense between the President and Congress.  
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 A study of accounts within the DoD indicates that this picture is not as smooth 
as it seems. The peace dividend at the end of the Cold War is apparent. It is also 
clear that the procurement account is the most volatile. 
 
Figure 3. DoD Budget Authority by Title, FY1985-2007 
 
When the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) is overlaid on the DoD budget, it 
is clear that the future rarely unrolls as expected. Over twenty years, only the 1982 
FYDP unrolled about as expected. Reality moved away from the other years as 
often as the second year of the FYDP. This gives rise to the adage, “Everyone gets 
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This picture of volatility and unpredictability has long historical roots. 
Figure 5. Evolution of the FY2003-2007 Plan in a Historical Perspective 
DoD Budget Authority (FY2003 Const $ - Billions) 
 
In fact, the disagreement between the FYDP and reality may be traced back 
to the 1960’s. 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 4- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
 Figure 6. DoD Budget - TOA 
 
It is not unexpected then, that as plans change, so do budgets; this includes 
budgets for the procurement accounts and weapons system acquisition patterns.  
For example, the Raptor program shows increasing expense and decreasing 
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 Figure 7. The Raptor Program 
The current DoD resource allocation system is PPBE, a system that includes 
capital and operational budgeting through the DAS-JCIDS-PPBE process.
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 Figure 8. The Budget Processes 
















































From Department of Defense Instruction 2004, 3
Links
 
Figure 9. The Budget Processes (Continued) 
Links: PPBE ↔ DAS
Systems Acquisition
(Demonstration, Engineering 































































After Solis 2004, 28  
However, the story that these diagrams tell is that most of the lifecycle cost of 
weapons systems is locked in before they enter the budget system. The rest of the 
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 story is the reciprocal adjustment of program-to-budget as annual budgets encounter 
the volatility of reality, as may be seen in the Raptor example. Moreover, often 
procurement accounts are “robbed” to fund operating missions. 


















System Devel. & Demo.
Production      Sustainment
 
We suggest that perhaps it would be wise to separate capital and operating 
budgets for the DoD. The current system is operable, but its overhead and 
administrative costs are high, top-level people have to pay constant attention to it, 
and weapons systems are always in danger of being delivered late or over-budget 
and under requirements. In fact, DoD has already recognized this and begun the 
movement.  
QDR Recommends Capital Budget 
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review has recommended that DoD 
establish a capital account for major acquisition programs. This recommendation 
mirrors the outcome of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment study 
directed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England. In its findings in 
December, 2005, this study recommended: 
The Secretary of Defense should establish a separate Acquisition Stabilization 
account to mitigate the tendency to stretch programs due to shortfalls in the 
Department of Defense non-acquisition accounts that ultimately increases the total 
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 cost of programs. This will substantially reduce the incidence of “breaking” programs 
to solve budget year shortfalls and significantly enhance program funding stability. 
(Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment, 2005, p. 10). 
In effect, the panel recognized that acquisition account leaders could not 
protect the acquisition accounts from acting as a bank for the operating accounts 
during budget execution—thus the recommendation that DoD’s procurement, 
research and development budget be separated from the overall defense budget. 
This separation: 
would help prevent the kind of financial whiplash that causes cost overruns, said 
retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, panel director and a vice president at Booz 
Allen Hamilton, a government consulting firm in Fairfax, Va. The panel found that 
every dollar taken from a program induces $4 of cost increases in later years… 
Though many in Washington blame the uncertainty on Congress, Kadish said most 
of the damage was self-inflicted by the Pentagon. (Ratnam, 2005). 
In its work comparing best practices in industry and DoD acquisition 
programs, the GAO sent out surveys to 185 Category I and II DoD programs 
managers in April, 2005 (GAO, 2005, November—The response rate was 69%. See 
page 19-20 for a discussion of methodology.). Their responses illustrate some of this 
turbulence. Results from this study indicate that the problem is not only the non-
acquisition accounts robbing the acquisition accounts, but also that the DoD has 
flaws in what could be called its capital budget process: it starts too many programs 
and fails to prioritize programs in process so that resources may be shifted to the 
most appropriate program when necessary in a distressed fiscal environment (e.g., 
when costs of raw materials or labor rise). The GAO says: 
The primary problem, according to many program managers and verified by 
GAO’s work, is that DoD starts more programs than it can afford and does not 
prioritize programs for funding. This creates an environment where programs must 
continually compete for funding. Before programs are even started, advocates are 
incentivized to underestimate both cost and schedule and overpromise capability. 
(GAO, 2005, November, pp. 8-9) 
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 Program manager comments tend to blame OSD for part of the problem, as 
well as funding instability. 
Figure 11. Highlights of Program Manager Comments Regarding 
Competition for Funding (GAO, 2005, November, p. 40) 
 
As Figure 11 intimates, program managers believed that they were operating 
in an environment where there was unfair competition for funding (GAO, 2005, 
November, p. 40).  The results were all too predictable.  The next two figures 
indicate some of the dimensions of the problem. First, in Figure 12, most program 
managers believed that the parameters of their program were reasonable at the 
start, with about 24% falling in the some (18%) or little or no (6%) categories.  
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 Figure 12. To What Extent Were the Parameters of Your Program Reasonable at 
Program Start? (GAO, 2005, November, p. 43) 
 
Figure 13. How Program Managers Responded to an Open-ended Question on What 
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 In response to an open-ended question on biggest obstacles, 36% of the 
managers responded that funding instability was the biggest obstacle, almost three 
times the number who mentioned requirements instability, the next category. What 
these evidences seem to hint is that much of the cause of acquisition turbulence lies 
in the funding mechanism.  
In Secretary England’s confirmation hearings, both the Senate and House 
Armed Services Committees expressed an interest in improving acquisition 
practices, an interest that was specified in the reports on the DoD authorization bill. 
For example, the Senate report accompanying S1042, the Senate version of the 
Defense Authorization bill, notes that after nearly twenty years of reform since the 
Packard Commission Report and Goldwater-Nichols, “major weapons systems still 
cost too much and take too long to field.” The committee added, “Funding and 
requirements instability continue to drive up costs and delay the eventual fielding of 
new systems. Constant changes in funding and requirements lead to continuous 
changes in acquisition approaches” (Senate Report, 2005, May 17, p. 345—see also 
House Conference Report, 2005, May 20, pp. 354-356).  
The end of this thread lies in the recommendations and findings made in the 
QDR in language that went beyond the establishment of a capital account, to include 
a capital budgeting process: 
Fourth, to manage the budget allocation process with accountability, an 
acquisition reform study initiated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense recommended 
the Department work with the Congress to establish “Capital Accounts” for Major 
Acquisition Programs. The purpose of capital budgeting is to provide stability in the 
budgeting system and to establish accountability for acquisition programs throughout 
the hierarchy of program responsibility from the program manager, through the 
Service Acquisition Executive, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. Together, these improvements should enable 
senior leaders to implement a risk-informed investment strategy reflecting joint 
warfighting priorities. (Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006, February, pp. 67-68) 
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 This process would be supported by a procedure that would rest on joint 
collaboration among the warfighter, acquisition and resource communities, with the 
warfighters assessing needs and time-frame and the acquisition community 
contributing technological judgments on technological feasibility and “cost-per-
increment” of capability improvement. The budget community’s contribution would 
be an assessment of affordability. These inputs would be provided early in the 
process, before significant amounts of resources are committed. The QDR also 
recommended that the DoD, “begin to break out its budget according to joint 
capability areas. Using such a joint capability view—in place of a Military Department 
or traditional budget category display—should improve the Department’s 
understanding of the balancing of strategic risks and required capability trade-offs 
associated with particular decisions” (Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006, February, 
pp. 67-68). The DoD promised to explore this approach later with Congress. History 
indicates that Congress clings tenaciously to the appropriation structure currently in 
place because it serves Congress’s purposes, but it is good to remember that all that 
is now familiar was once new. 
In the figure below from the GAO work on Best Practices (2005, p. 59), 
program managers reported on what types of authority they thought they needed. 
The implications are clear: program managers believe they need more authority to 
execute their programs and efficiently allocate the resources they have been given, 
without undue and unnecessary oversight, without needlessly complicated reporting 
requirements. The GAO found that program managers expressed frustration with the 
time required of them to answer queries of oversight officials, “many of which did not 
add value. Some program managers, in fact, estimated that they spent more than 50 
percent of their time producing and tailoring and explaining status information to 
others”(GAO,  2005, November, p. 46). The GAO also noted, “program managers 
commented that requirements continue to be added as the program progresses and 
funding instability continues throughout. These two factors alone cause the greatest 
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 Perusal of the comments below indicate that a capital account process will 
cure some of the problems program managers reported, but not all, without 
dramatically changing reporting arrangements in the military departments. 
Figure 14. Highlights of Program Manager Comments on What Types of Authority 
They Need (GAO, 2005, November) 
 
In the next section, we asses the state of capital budgeting in the DoD and 
the private sector. 
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 Capital Budgeting in the DoD and the Private 
Sector 
A.  DoD Capital Budgeting Principles and Methods 
The process of budgeting for capital assets in the Department of Defense 
(DoD) is a complex process with many moving parts.  While DoD employs some of 
the same techniques for evaluating capital projects as organizations in the private 
sector do, such as cost-benefit analyses, it does not have a separate capital budget 
and must take many other factors into account when designing its plan for capital 
spending.  The process of budgeting for capital assets in the DoD, as well as other 
federal agencies and departments, is governed by rules set forth by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), in legislation passed annually by Congress, in the 
Financial Management Regulations (FMR), in federal appropriation law and other 
laws and administrative rules.  Additionally, DoD proposals for new capital projects 
“must be supported by elaborate analytical justifications and reviewed and approved 
by hundreds of people all along the line from the lowest to the highest echelon” 
(Jones & Thompson, 1999).   
1. Definition of Capital Assets 
Capital assets, as defined by OMB, are “land, structures, equipment, 
intellectual property, and information systems that are used by the Federal 
Government that have a useful life of two years or more” (OMB, 2003).   
2. Principles of Budgeting for Capital Assets 
Before any capital spending is included in the President’s Budget, the DoD 
must satisfy the principles of planning, costs and benefits, financing, and risk 
management requirements as set forth by OMB.  
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 a. Planning 
When planning for investments in capital assets, the DoD must ensure that 
the following criteria are met:  
• The asset must support the core missions of the DoD. 
• No other private or public agency can support the function more efficiently 
than the DoD. 
• The asset should support work processes that reduce costs, improve 
effectiveness, and make maximum use of commercial, off-the-shelf 
technology. 
• The asset must demonstrate a return-on-investment superior to any other 
alternative.  Returns can include improved mission performance, reduced 
cost, and increased quality, speed, or flexibility. 
• The asset must reduce risk.  This basically means that fully tested pilots or 
prototypes are pursued before proceeding with full funding for the end item.   
• If the investment is planned for more than one asset (i.e., 100 Joint Strike 
Fighters), then it must be implemented in phases as narrow in scope as 
practicable, with each phase delivering a measurable net benefit independent 
of future phases.   
• The asset should employ an acquisition strategy that allocates the risk 
efficiently between the Government and the contractor, uses competition, ties 
contract payments to performance, and takes advantage of commercial 
technology (OMB Circular A-11, Appendix J).  
OMB uses this information to determine the feasibility of the investment, set 
the basis for full-funding, and for deciding whether the capital purchase has been 
justified well enough to be included in the budget (OMB, 2003).   
b. Costs and Benefits 
In addition to meeting the above criteria, DoD justification for the purchase of 
any particular capital asset must include a cost-benefit analysis.  The asset’s total 
lifecycle costs must be compared to the benefits that it is expected to provide.  
However, as is the case for many of DoD capital asset proposals, the benefits of the 
asset may be hard to define in monetary terms, which is why the focus is generally 
placed on lifecycle costs.  Additionally, when comparing different capital projects, it 
may be determined that each asset provides essentially the same benefit.  For 
example, if DoD is evaluating two competing designs (i.e., from two different 
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 contractors) for a new weapons system, even though the design may be different, 
the benefit provided by each one may essentially be the same.  In these instances, 
DoD can conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis of the competing programs/assets 
(OMB, 1992).  The standard used in conducting cost-benefit analysis is net present 
value.  This process involves assigning monetary values to the benefits and costs of 
the asset, discounting these values using an appropriate discount rate (set by OMB), 
and subtracting the sum of discounted costs from the sum of discounted benefits.  
Capital investments with a positive net present value are preferred to those with a 
negative net present value.  
DoD may also conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis when justifying a capital 
asset proposal.   As stated in OMB Circular A-94, “A program is cost-effective if, on 
the basis of lifecycle cost analysis of competing alternatives, it is determined to have 
the lowest costs expressed in present value terms for a given amount of benefits.”  
This type of analysis is used when benefits either can not be monetized or it is not 
practical to monetize the benefits.  As noted previously, this is often the case for 
DoD weapons systems.  However, when benefits can not be monetized, OMB 
encourages DoD to supplement cost-effectiveness analyses with information that 
quantifies the benefits in physical measurements or effectiveness measures (OMB, 
1992).  For example, DoD may quantify the benefits of a new aircraft in terms of 
increased readiness percentages, capability to deliver more ordnance than current 
aircraft, or lower maintenance costs.   
c. Financing 
OMB has established principles of financing that DoD must consider when 
proposing spending for capital assets.  The principles include the following: (1) full 
funding, (2) regular and advanced appropriations, and (3) separate funding of 
planning segments (OMB, 2003).  
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can incur obligations for the capital asset.  A “useful segment” is, “a unit of a capital 
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 project that can be economically or programmatically useful even if the entire project 
is not completed” (GAO, 1998).  Full funding ensures that all costs and benefits are 
taken into account at the same time that decisions are made by Congress to provide 
or not provide BA for a capital investment.  Full funding also helps to ensure lower 
acquisition costs, prevent cancellation of projects, and ensure that enough funding is 
provided to maintain and operate the assets (OMB, 2003).  
Full funding by regular appropriation in the budget year is recommended by 
Congress and the GAO because it allows decision makers to make tradeoffs 
between competing capital projects as well as other spending purposes.  However, 
this may result in “spikes” in the budget that are not good for the DoD or Congress.  
Given the large dollar amounts required for many DoD capital asset acquisitions, this 
situation often presents itself.  In situations like this, a combination of a regular 
appropriation in the budget year and some advance appropriations in subsequent 
years may be necessary to fully fund a capital project (OMB, 2003). 
Planning for a capital asset should be funded separately from the actual 
purchase of the asset. The DoD needs information in order to plan, develop designs, 
compute costs and benefits, and assess risk levels for capital projects.  Most of this 
information comes from the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
process.  Separate funding for RDT&E and procurement helps to ensure that costs, 
schedules, and performance goals are known prior to proceeding to actual 
procurement of the assets (OMB, 2003). 
d. Risk Management Requirements 
Risk management is an important aspect in the process of budgeting for 
capital assets.  The DoD must conduct a thorough risk analysis for each capital 
asset acquisition in order to minimize cost overruns, schedule problems, and assets 
that fail to perform as expected.  Risk analyses should define how risks will be 
minimized, monitored, and controlled.  Finally, the DoD must, “ensure that the 
necessary acquisition strategies are implemented to reduce the risk of cost 
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 escalation and the risk of failure to achieve schedule and performance goals” (OMB, 
2003).  
3. Planning Phase of the Capital Programming Process 
Detailed and comprehensive planning is even more necessary when trying to 
manage limited budgetary assets, which is the situation with most federal agencies, 
including the Department of Defense.  Budgeting and planning, therefore, must be 
linked together in order for success.  “There can be no good budget without a plan, 
and there can be no executable plan without a budget to fund it” (Capital 
Programming Guide, 1997).   
The planning phase is the nucleus of the capital budgeting process used in 
most federal agencies. Decisions yielded by the planning phase are applied 
throughout the budgeting and other phases, and information from the other phases 
feeds back into the planning phase. The six steps in the planning phase are 1) 
strategic and program performance linkage, 2) baseline assessment and identifying 
the performance gap, 3) functional requirements, 4) alternatives to capital assets, 5) 
choosing the best capital asset, which focuses on benefit/cost and risk analysis, and 
6) the agency capital plan, which is to include an inventory of existing capital assets 
(President’s Conference Staff Budget Staff Paper, 1998).  Each of these steps will 
be discussed in greater detail below. 
a. Strategic and Program Performance Linkage 
The Government Planning and Results Act (GPRA) established the legal 
requirements for federal agencies to develop strategic plans and link these plans to 
requests for budgetary resources.  The capital programming process (a.k.a. capital 
budgeting) is an important piece of any agency’s strategic planning process.  Quality 
strategic plans should detail the agency’s needs for particular capabilities, identify 
the capital assets that are needed to accomplish the goals of the agency’s plan, and 
delineate the results that these capital assets will produce.  The agency’s strategic 
plan also needs to take into account the estimated budgetary resources that will be 
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 available and define goals and objectives for each major program based on the 
agency’s mission (Capital Programming Guide, 1997).   
In 1996, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) produced a study that 
described three practices that are extremely important for strategic planning to have 
the desired impact.  The three practices are as follows:  
• Involve all the pertinent stakeholders to include Congress, the Administration, 
customers, service providers, employees, and interest groups. 
• Take an assessment of the agency’s internal and external environments in an 
effort to anticipate future difficulties so that appropriate adjustments can be 
made. 
• Align the agency’s activities, processes, and resources to support results that 
are in line with the mission.  
These practices are similar to the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and 
Threats (SWOT) analyses that private corporations use in their strategic planning 
processes.  
Agency strategic plans should produce goals and objectives for its programs.  
These goals and objectives, embodied in an agency annual performance plan, 
should detail how outputs will be achieved and describe the role that particular 
capital assets will play in achieving the desired outcomes.  This information 
essentially defines “how much bang we are getting for the public’s buck” (OMB, 
1997).  The better an agency is able to link a capital asset to a strategic, mission-
related outcome, the more likely it will be able to justify the resource request 
associated with that capital asset.  
b. Baseline Assessment and Identifying the Performance Gap  
The Office of Management and Budget has established that federal agencies 
should conduct planning through Integrated Project Teams (IPT) that brings together 
several disciplines to evaluate the capabilities of existing capital assets.  This 
evaluation will help provide information needed for identifying performance gaps 
between current and planned results.  Additionally, the assessment of current assets 
should include information concerning functionality, lifecycle costs and the 
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 affordability of lifecycle costs, risk, and the agency’s ability to manage risk.  This 
information for every agency program enables the agency to examine their entire 
collection of capital assets when trying to define alternatives to fill performance gaps.   
c. Functional Requirements 
If it is determined that an agency’s current capital assets cannot bridge the 
performance gaps, the gaps need to be defined in terms of additional performance 
requirements that need to be met.  The agency must take care not to define these 
requirements in terms of specific equipment, but rather in terms of mission 
requirements, capabilities needed, cost objectives, and constraints.  As these 
functional requirements are being generated, the capabilities of other assets and/or 
processes must be considered.  For example, it may be determined that a new, 
technologically advanced capital asset is needed to meet a program’s goal.  
However, if the other assets that support this “new” asset have obsolete technology 
which will not “work” with the new asset, simply buying the new asset may not 
enable that program to meet the desired requirements.   
d. Alternatives to Capital Assets  
Once the requirements have been defined, the agency must now determine 
whether a new capital asset is needed to meet the requirement.  In general, given 
the expense involved with the purchase of many capital assets, agencies should 
spend considerable effort to determine if there may be procedural or process 
improvement actions that can be taken to meet the defined requirement.  The Office 
of Management and Budget has suggested that federal agencies should answer the 
following questions prior to making the decision to purchase new capital assets: 
1. Does the investment in a major capital asset support core/priority mission functions that need 
to be performed by the Federal Government? 
2. Does the investment need to be undertaken by the requesting agency because no alternative 
private sector or governmental source can better support the function? 
3. Does the investment support work processes that have been simplified or otherwise 
redesigned to reduce costs, improve effectiveness, and make maximum use of commercial, 
off-the-shelf technology (COTS)? 
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 Only if the answer to all of these questions is “yes,” should the agency 
proceed with an acquisition of a new capital asset.  Even if all questions are 
answered positively, the agency is still encouraged to consider all viable alternatives 
to meet the requirement including the use of human assets  
e. Choosing the Best Capital Asset  
The IPT needs information from management to determine if resources will 
be available for the purchase of new capital assets when the decision to purchase 
new capital assets has been made.  Emphasis needs to be placed on innovative 
proposals from private industry contractors that make full use of competition 
between vendors.  The IPT should also explore the use of commercial off-the-shelf 
technology and non-developmental items (NDI) in an effort to mitigate costs 
associated with purchasing a particular capital asset (OMB, 1997). 
After a list of alternatives has been compiled, cost-benefit analyses need to 
be conducted, taking into account acquisition costs and numerous other lifecycle 
costs as well as the benefits that the asset will provide.  Where possible, these 
benefits should be monetized and compared with the costs associated with the 
asset.  The time value of money should also be included in the analysis.  Specific 
and detailed attention should be placed on obtaining realistic and credible estimates 
of lifecycle costs of the asset 
Risk must be taken into account and planned for with every capital asset 
acquisition.  Risk comes in numerous forms to include schedules’ risk, cost risk, risk 
of project failure, and interdependency issues with other assets/programs.  When 
developing a strategy to mitigate and manage risk, the IPT needs to consider all 
sources of risk and high risk should only be accepted when it can be justified by high 
expected returns from the asset (OMB, 1997). 
The planning phase of the capital programming process must also include the 
development of plans for contract type, competition strategies, and management of 
capital assets during their lifecycle.  The plans set forth in these areas are no less 
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 important than those discussed above and are critical to acquiring an asset that will 
truly meet the needs of the agency while delivering the required mission-related 
results (OMB, 1997). 
f. The Agency Capital Plan 
The final step in the planning process is the development of an agency capital 
plan.  This capital plan should be part of the larger strategic plan for the agency and 
should detail the long-term decisions made with respect to the agency’s capital asset 
portfolio.  OMB currently encourages the federal agencies to develop these plans, 
but there is no “requirement” for agencies to have them. 
The Agency Capital Plan is the most important output of the planning phase.  
However, the agency should not treat the plan as “set in stone” but rather a living 
document that can change as plans and priorities change over time.  This document 
should serve as the agency’s primary document for capital asset planning and can 
also be used to create budget justifications to Congress.  This comprehensive plan 
should include, at a minimum, the following items: 
• Statement of the agency’s mission, strategic goals, and objectives 
• Description of the planning phase 
• Baseline assessments and identification of performance gaps 
• Justification of spending requests for proposed new assets 
• Staffing requirements 
• Timing issues 
• Plans for proposed capital assets once purchased and in use 
• Summary of the risk management plans 
Finally, the Agency Capital Plan should include a detailed description of how 
each asset in the agency’s portfolio will enable the agency to achieve its outcome 
and output goals (that are defined in the strategic plan). 
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 4. Budgeting Phase of Capital Programming Process 
The budgeting phase of the capital programming process, which can also be 
called the “justification” or “approval” phase, formally begins when the agency, such 
as the Department of Defense, submits its request for capital asset acquisitions to 
the Office of Management and Budget.  The OMB will then make its 
recommendation to the President for the construction of the President’s Budget.  
This phase ends when Congress appropriates funding and the OMB apportions 
funds to the DoD for the purchase of capital assets.  If the decision is made not to 
fund the acquisition, it could return to the planning phase for submission the next 
year or the capital investment may be subject to further DoD review to determine if 
another investment better suits DoD strategic goals (Capital Programming Guide, 
Section II).  The specific steps in the budgeting phase are briefly described below: 
• Step 1: Agency Submission for Funding: In this step, the agency submits its budget, 
which includes the portfolio of capital assets approved by the agency head, such as 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in the case of the DoD, to the OMB for approval.  The 
submission should be in harmony with the principles of budgeting for capital assets 
detailed above. The OMB will then analyze the agency’s submission, often asking the 
agency to provide additional information, and make its recommendation to the President.   
• Step 2: Passback: In this step, the agency is notified of OMB’s recommendation to the 
President.  If the agency’s justification for the asset is not in compliance with the 
principles of budgeting for capital assets, they may have to make substantial changes to 
their initial request to include changes to funding levels, performance goals, and 
financing alternatives.  The agency also has the option to appeal (reclama) OMB’s 
recommendation to the President. 
• Step 3: Agency Revision: The agency may have to make adjustments to its proposal for 
capital spending due to changes that took place during the pass-back phase.   
• Step 4: Approved for the President’s Budget: Once the agency’s proposal has made it 
through OMB scrutiny, it is now included in the President’s budget proposal to Congress. 
• Step 5: Congressional Approval/OMB Apportionment: If Congress approves the 
proposal, it appropriates Budget Authority and the OMB apportions the BA to the DoD 
and the other federal agencies.  After apportionment, Congress, the OMB, and other 
parties within the agency monitor the procurement process and implement corrective 
actions if necessary (OMB, 1997).   
5. GAO Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making 
In fiscal year 1997, the federal government spent $72.2B on capital assets.  
Of this amount, $52.4B, or roughly 73 percent, was spent for defense-related capital 
assets.  Federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, are challenged with 
demands to improve performance in fiscally restrained environments.  As a result, it 
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 is increasingly important for federal agencies to make effective capital acquisition 
choices, implement those choices well, and maintain the capital assets embodied in 
these choices over the long term.  
The Government Accountability Office developed the Executive Guide: 
Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making as a supplement to OMB’s more 
specific Capital Programming Guide.  The Executive Guide “identifies attributes that 
are important to the capital decision-making process as a whole, as well as capital 
decision-making principles and practices used by outstanding state and local 
governments and private sector organizations.”  The guide also provides information 
about the Coast Guard in an effort to determine the applicability of these principles 
and practices to a federal agency.  The Executive Guide is not meant to be a 
detailed rulebook, rather it is meant to be illustrative in nature and serve as a 
complement to the Capital Programming Guide.  In constructing The Executive 
Guide, the GAO identified and studied several government and private organizations 
that are recognized for outstanding capital decision-making practices.  The 
organizations studied are as follows: 
• State of Maryland 
• State of Minnesota 
• State of Missouri 
• State of Virginia 
• State of Washington 
• Dayton, Ohio 
• Montgomery County, Maryland 
• Phoenix, Arizona 
• Ford Motor Company 
• General Electric 
• Mobil Corporation 
• Texas Instruments 
The Executive Guide divides the desired capital budgeting attributes into five 
broad principles as follows: 
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 Principle 2: Evaluate and select capital assets using an investment approach. 
Principle 3: Balance budgetary control and managerial flexibility when funding 
capital projects. 
Principle 4: Use project management techniques to optimize project success. 
Principle 5: Evaluate results and incorporate lessons learned into the 
decision-making process. 
B. Private Sector Capital Budgeting Principles and Methods 
This section will describe the capital budgeting process for organizations in 
the private sector.  Specifically, the section will define capital budgeting, discuss the 
primary capital budgeting decision criteria, introduce some guidelines that are used 
to make capital spending decisions, and explain how risk is incorporated into the 
capital budgeting process in the private sector.   
1. Capital Budgeting in the Private Sector 
Capital budgeting is the area of financial management that establishes the 
criteria for investing in long-term projects.  More often than not, these projects 
involve the acquisition of property, plant, and equipment.  Simply put, capital 
budgeting is “The decision-making process with respect to investment in fixed 
assets” (Keown et al., 2005).  This decision-making process helps private 
organizations determine whether or not to accept or reject a proposed capital 
investment project.  A fixed asset, also known as a capital asset, is defined as, “A 
long-term, tangible asset held for business use and not expected to be converted to 
cash in the current or upcoming fiscal year, such as manufacturing equipment, real 
estate, etc.” (http://www.investorwords.com).  Since cash can be classified as a 
“benefit” to the private firm, one can combine the two definitions above and restate 
the definition of capital budgeting as the decision-making process that is used to 
purchase assets that provide long-term benefits to the organization.  
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 2. Capital Budgeting Criteria 
Competition is intense in the private-sector marketplace.  Once a firm comes 
up with a profitable investment project, competitors often rush in—which results in 
reduced prices and profits.  Due to this, private-sector firms must have a strategy to 
consistently generate ideas for new capital projects.  Without a consistent flow of 
new capital projects (or projects that improve existing products), the firm will not be 
able to grow, or even survive, in the private-sector marketplace.  Like most public 
sector organizations, many private firms have Research and Development (R&D) 
operations or departments that are tasked with coming up with proposals for new 
capital projects and designing improvements to existing products (Keown et al., 291-
292).  How are the capital project proposals generated by R&D evaluated to 
determine profitability for the private firm? 
Few methods are available to execute capital budgeting.  These include the 
simple payback period method (PB), the net present value method (NPV), the 
profitability index (PI) method, and the internal rate of return method (IRR). Over the 
past fifty years, the focus on a particular method has shifted almost every decade.  
The internal rate of return and the net present value techniques slowly gained in 
popularity until today, where they are now used by virtually all major corporations in 
decision-making (Keown et al., 2005). 
In addition to the existing methods, computer modeling recently became 
available to financial managers.  This technique bridges the gap between theory and 
practical application.  
Choosing the appropriate methodology to execute capital budgeting is very 
important.  This review will discuss a few aspects of capital budgeting: net present 
value, the internal rate of return, the payback method, computer modeling, and risk 
considerations. Furthermore, it will introduce how the Fortune 1000 companies 
execute capital budgeting.  
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 a. Net Present Value  
The discounting methods of cash flow are based on discounting cash inflows 
and outflows to their present values.  Therefore, this technique considers the time 
value of money.  Clark, Hindelang, and Pritchard (1989) define the net present value 
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CO =  present value of the after-tax cost of the project 
CI   =  the after-tax cash inflow to be received in period t 
    k =  appropriate discount rate or hurdle rate 
    t  =  time period 
    n =  useful life of asset  
The goal of using this formula is to determine whether the net present value is 
equal to, less than, or greater than zero.  If the NPV is positive, then the project is 
expected to yield a return higher than the required rate.  If NPV is zero, then the 
yield and required rate are expected to be equal.  Lastly, if NPV is less than zero, 
then the yield is expected to be below the required rate.  The significance of the net 
present value results is that, normally, only those projects with a value equal to or 
greater than zero will be considered.  This NPV formula was widely used in the 
1990s.  The formula being used today, according to Keown et al., (2005), has been 
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FCF=  annual free cash flow in time period t 
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 K    =  the appropriate discount rate; that is, the required rate of return or cost 
of capital 
IO   =  the initial outlay 
N    =  the project’s expected life 
 As Clark et al. (1989) observed:  
We support our preference for the NPV model as the unique evaluation 
technique that consistently helps firms to maximize common shareholder’s wealth 
positions.  Whenever mutually exclusive projects are being evaluated, only the NPV 
model will consistently show the firm the project or set of projects that will maximize 
the value of the firm.   
Today’s view of using the NPV model for its benefits has not changed much. 
“Acceptance of a project using the NPV criteria adds to the value of the firm, which is 
in harmony with the private firm’s goal of maximizing shareholder value” (Keown et 
al., 2005). 
The use of the NPV method when selecting projects seems the most 
appropriate because it takes into account cash flows as opposed to accounting 
profits.  It also considers the time value of money, which makes the calculation more 
realistic.  Lastly, the NPV method is sensitive to the true timing of benefits received 
from a project.  The only difficulty with the NPV method is accurately determining the 
exact required rate of return.  To overcome this obstacle, many firms use the cost of 
capital as the required rate of return.  This rate is the most emphasized in current 
finance practices. 
The NPV capital budgeting decision method is superior to simpler capital 
budgeting decision methods for four major reasons: 
1. It deals with free cash flows rather than accounting profits. 
2. It is sensitive to the true timing of benefits received from a project. 
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 3. It incorporates the time value of money which supports a rational comparison 
of a project’s benefits and costs.   
4. Acceptance of a project using the NPV criteria adds to the value of the firm, 
which is in harmony with the private firm’s goal of maximizing shareholder 
value (Keown et al, 2005).   
b. Internal Rate of Return  
The internal rate of return is another discounted cash flow method used for 
capital budgeting decisions.  By definition, the internal rate of return (IRR) is that rate 
which exactly equates the present value of the expected after-tax cash inflows with 
the present value of the after-tax cash outflows (Clark et al., 1989).   
The internal rate of return is not easily identified.  Few tools are available to 
determine the internal rate of return.  One of these tools is identifying the discount 
factor.  This calculation consists of dividing the initial outlay by the yearly average 
expected cash inflows.  Upon finding the discount factor, it is compared against 
compound interest and annuity tables to determine what percentage corresponds to 
that specific discount factor.  The percentage selected is then used as a starting 
number to multiply the cash inflows by until a NPV close to or greater than zero is 
found.  Therefore, if the percentage selected does not give a NPV of zero or greater, 
then the number is adjusted up or down until it reaches the targeted value.   
Once the IRR of a project has been determined, it is then compared to the 
required rate of return.  The purpose is to decide whether or not the project is 
acceptable.  If the IRR is equal to or greater than the required rate of return, then the 
project is acceptable.  Of course, projects can also be ranked in accordance with 
IRRs.  The project with the highest IRR would be rank number one, the second 
highest IRR would be ranked number two, and so forth. 
There are cases where the sign of the cash inflows varies over the life of the 
project.  This type of situation brings about variable internal rates of return.  When 
encountering multiple IRRs over the life of a project, other evaluative calculations 
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 The Internal Rate of Return method requires estimating a rate of return based 
on the discount factor. Each discount factor does not have a unique corresponding 
rate.  Therefore, financial managers use an “approximation” in selecting the IRR.  
The NPV calculation is more precise, and therefore is preferred over the IRR 
methodology for capital budgeting. 
The internal rate of return (IRR) criterion helps private firms determine a 
capital project’s rate of return.  “Mathematically, it is the discount rate that equates 
the present value of the (cash) inflows with the present value of the (cash) outflows” 
(Keown et al., 2005).  A capital project is accepted by the firm if its IRR is greater 
than the firm’s required rate of return (i.e., cost of capital).  On the other hand, a 
capital project is rejected if its IRR is less than the firm’s required rate of return.  The 
IRR method exhibits the same advantages as the NPV method and yields similar 
accept-reject decisions. However, the reinvestment rate assumption imbedded in the 
IRR method is inferior to that of the NPV method (Keown et al., 2005).  
c. Payback Method 
The payback method uses the number of years of cash flow required to 
recapture the original cost of an investment, normally disregarding salvage value 
(Osteryoung, 1979).  There are two approaches to calculating the payback value.  
The first method is used when annual cash flows are equal in value.  For example, if 
the initial outlay of a project is $20,000, the life of the project is five years, and the 
annual cash flow is $2,000 then the payback calculation is as follows: 
Payback = 20,000/2,000            Payback = 10 years 
The second method of calculating the payback value is applicable when the 
annual cash flows are unequal.  In this case, two calculations take place:  the annual 
cash flow and the cumulative cash flow.   The values of the cumulative cash flows 
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 Table 1. Evaluation of Projects (Osteryoung, 1979) 
 
Table I. Evaluation of Projects with Unequal Cash Flow Using Payback 
Initial Cost $15,000       Life (in years) 5 
Year Annual Cash Flow Cumulative Cash Flow 
1 $2000 $2,000 
2 4000 6,000 
3 6000 12,000 
4 7000 19,000 
5 3000 22,000 
 
The cumulative cash flow in any year is the summation of the prior year's 
cumulative total and the annual cash flow for the current year.  The initial cost for 
this project was $15,000, which is not clearly identified as a cash flow.  Therefore, to 
find the payback, a bracket must be identified where $15,000 falls in.  In this case, 
the initial outlay of $15,000 falls between $12,000 and $19,000.  As a result, the 
payback time for this project will be 3 years and a fraction.  To compute the fraction, 
the difference between $15,000 and $12,000 ($3,000) will be divided by the next 
cash flow, which is $7,000.  The fraction then results in a value of 0.43.  The final 
payback period is 3.43 years. 
Calculating payback is a very simple method.  Smaller firms whose budgets 
are limited are more prone to use the payback method based on its simplicity.  
However, the payback method does not account for additional cash flows after the 
payback period, which neglects including the value of the additional cash flows in the 
decision-making process.  Another disadvantage of the payback method is that it 
neglects the relationship of timing and yields.   
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 d. Inflation and Discount Rates 
One of the most difficult challenges in using quantitative methods to 
determine the feasibility of capital investment projects is to accurately determine 
inflation and discount rates over the life of a project.  
Drury and Tayles (1997) in their article "Misapplication of Capital Investment 
Appraisal Techniques,” observe: “Firms are guilty of rejecting worthwhile 
investments because of the improper treatment of inflation in the financial appraisal. 
Inflation affects both future cash flows and the cost of capital that is used to discount 
the cash flows.”  Cash flows can be expressed in real terms (today’s current 
purchasing power) and nominal terms (purchasing power at the time the cash flow 
occurs).  Therefore, inconsistency in using nominal versus real terms can lead to 
miscalculations of the real value or benefits of a project.   As a result, the NPV of 
projects can be understated or overstated.  Long-term projects are most susceptible 
to mismatching of inflation because failing to include inflation in cash flows estimates 
compounds with time.  
 In other cases, some cash flows do not fully adjust with the general rate of 
inflation or simply do not adjust at all.  For example, lease payments and fixed-price 
purchase or sale contracts do not change with the inflation rate.  Therefore, to 
convert future cash flows to real cash flows, they must be deflated by the general 
rate of inflation.   
e. Computer Modeling and Capital Budgeting 
Among the many benefits technology has brought about, simulation modeling 
is one of the applications beneficial to capital budgeting.  Computer modeling has 
become one of the most important tools in an attempt to close the gap between 
theory and application.  When considering capital budgeting, “Special attention must 
be paid to the timing of receipts and outlays; and the handling of fixed and variable 
costs, accounting depreciation, working capital, interest expense and opportunity 
costs” (Harris, 1982).  In capital budgeting, projects are evaluated by considering the 
incremental cash flows resulting from the investment.  There are two specific 
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 aspects to consider when working with cash flow projections: the investment 
decision (which projects to undertake) and the financing decision (how will the 
projects be financed).   Computer modeling can include many of the theoretical 
implications while integrating real-life investment factors and financing decisions. 
The model can be established to dynamically show transformations over the life of 
the project as a result of economic changes, like changing market rates or declining 
asset usage.  Furthermore, a firm’s ending cash-balance comparisons can be 
included with and without the project.  Modeling is very useful in cash-flow 
projection.  The models can help eliminate some of the theoretical uncertainties of 
net present value analysis.    
Harris (1982) states: “There are six steps involved in developing and using a 
computer model when analyzing capital projects: 1) Define the model, 2) gather 
information, 3) develop the baseline forecast, 4) evaluate the baseline forecast, 5) 
perform a sensitivity analysis, 6) evaluate capital expenditures.” 
As described by Harris, the first step in building a capital project model is to 
define the model.   In defining the model, the following relevant factors should be 
included: 1) level of complexity, 2) list of inputs, 3) list of desired outputs, 4) number 
of programs to be evaluated, 5) the extent of interactions and linkages between 
programs, and 6) financial information.  The next step is to gather information.  The 
amount of information to be gathered will be dependent on step one.  The scope of 
the information can include financial, statistical, fiscal, budgetary, and demographic 
data.  The third step is to build a baseline forecast.  This forecast includes two 
phases.  One of the phases covers the estimated demand for the capital asset and 
estimated usage, while the other encompasses the financial forecasts associated 
with such demand.  Once the baseline has been established, step four will evaluate 
the baseline forecast.   Evaluating the baseline consists of management reviewing 
the forecast’s reasonableness, validity, and accuracy. 
When evaluating the baseline, management must take into account trends in 
utilization, financial condition, profitability, required rate increases, and the 
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 attractiveness of the cash flows.  Step five consists of performing a sensitivity 
analysis.  Many firms use Excel-based applications, such as linear programming in 
Excel Solver, to produce a sensitivity analysis report.  This report presents the 
marginal change or effect resulting from changing the variables’ values within the 
model.  Another approach to conducting a sensitivity analysis is to incorporate 
assumptions relating to capital expenditures to assess the incremental effect on a 
capital program.  The analyst can determine a possible distribution of outcomes by 
modifying exogenous assumptions (i.e., inflation rates) and assigning probabilities to 
the possible range of changes.  Based on these outcomes, ranging from least 
probable to most probable, management can better prepare for offsetting those 
undesirable results.  Harris observes that the last step is to evaluate capital 
expenditures.  This step relates to modifying investment expenditures and the 
effects these changes have on possible outcomes. 
Computer modeling offers speed and accuracy in simulating complex 
situations for capital budgeting.  Additionally, modeling offers analysts a dynamic 
medium in which to assess many different and possible outcomes. 
3. Capital Budgeting Guidelines 
Like many organizations in the public sector, private firms have guidelines or 
“rules” that apply to the capital budgeting process.  However, unlike the specific 
rules and laws that federal agencies (such as the DoD) must follow when proposing 
capital investments, these guidelines are not “written in stone.”  Essentially, the 
guidelines used by private firms exist for one purpose, and that is to help firms 
determine how to measure the value of capital investment projects.  The decision 
criteria discussed above assumed that a capital project’s cash flows were known.  In 
reality, estimating the cash flows associated with a particular capital investment 
project is a difficult process.  Additionally, not all cash flows associated with a capital 
project are relevant in measuring its value.  The guidelines detailed in the next 
several paragraphs help private firms measure the value of capital projects by 
defining relevant cash flows (Keown et al., 2005).   
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 The first guideline is that private firms should use free cash flows rather than 
accounting profits to measure the value of capital projects.  Accounting profits are 
“booked” when “earned,” which may or may not mean that the firm actually has 
“cash in hand."  Free cash flows from a project can be reinvested by the firm and 
they “correctly reflect the timing of benefits and costs—that is, when the money is 
received, when it can be reinvested, and when it must be paid out” (Keown et al., 
2005).   
Another guideline is that firms must only consider the incremental cash flows 
associated with the acceptance of a capital project proposal.  This requires firms to 
look at the company as a whole and determine after-tax cash flows both with and 
without the project.  Additionally, incremental expenses must be considered.  Will the 
purchase of new machinery require that employees receive additional training?  If 
so, the cash flow associated with this training must be subtracted from the expected 
cash inflows of the new machinery (Keown et al., 2005).  
Next, private firms must consider how the capital project will affect the cash 
flows from existing products and operations.  For example, if a firm is considering 
the launch of a new product line, it must thoroughly analyze the expected effects (in 
terms of cash flows) this will have on their current product lines.  Will the new 
product cannibalize sales from existing products or will the new product bring 
increased sales to existing products?  Questions like these, as well as many others, 
must be answered before a new capital project is accepted (Keown et al., 2005).  
Finally, private firms must remember to consider sunk costs and opportunity 
costs during the capital budgeting process.  Sunk costs are cash flows that have 
already been spent on the project.  For example, if a firm has already spent money 
for a market feasibility study of a new product, the cash flow associated with this 
expense is “sunk” and should not be included in the capital budgeting analysis.  
Opportunity costs are “cash flows that are lost because a given [capital] project 
consumes scarce resources that would have produced cash flows if that project had 
been rejected” (Keown et al., 2005).  For example, if a firm owns vacant land and 
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 builds a strip mall on it, the opportunity cost for the strip mall project is the forgone 
cash flows if the land had been used for some other purpose.  Keown makes this 
final point about opportunity costs: “opportunity cost cash flows should reflect net 
cash flows that would have been received if the project under consideration were 
rejected.  Again, we are analyzing the cash flows to the company as a whole, with or 
without the project” (2005).    
4. Risk and Capital Budgeting 
Capital budgeting requires financial managers to make decisions regarding 
the commitment of resources to courses of action that are normally very expensive. 
Additionally, more often than not, these decisions are very costly and not reversible.  
To have successful outcomes in capital budgeting, managers must accurately 
anticipate future business and economic conditions.  Risk, therefore, can be 
described as the delta between the decisions made and actual future outcomes.  To 
deal with risk and choices in an appropriate and preferably objective manner, 
management must evaluate all capital investment proposals as rigorously as 
possible.  As the volatility of the business environment increases, those firms who 
are best able to navigate these uncertainties will prove to be the most successful in 
the long run.  
In evaluating capital budgeting decisions, financial managers must carefully 
identify and qualify financial risks.  Two main considerations financial managers 
must take into account are: 
1. Are they aware of all future states of the economy, business, and 
market trends? 
2. Are they able to place a probability and value on each of those states? 
 To better understand how managers evaluate or attempt to answer 
these questions, several terms must be defined.  Clark et al. (1989) highlight five 
specific types of risks:  business, investment, portfolio, cataclysm, and financial.  
These risks are defined by Clark et al as follows: 
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 • Business risk is the variability in earnings that is a function of the firm’s 
normal operations (as impacted by the changing economic environment) and 
management’s decisions with respect to capital intensification.  It should be 
noted that business risk considers only the variability in Earnings before 
Interests and Taxes (EBIT). 
• Investment risk is the variability in earnings due to variations in the cash 
inflows and outflows of capital investment projects undertaken.  This risk is 
associated with forecasting errors made in market acceptance of products, 
future technological changes, and changes in cost related to projects. 
• Portfolio risk is the variability in earnings due to the degree of efficient 
diversification that the firm has achieved in its operations and its overall 
portfolio of assets. 
• Cataclysm risk is the variability in earnings that is a function of events 
beyond managerial control and anticipation.  
• Financial risk is the variability in earnings that is a function of the financial 
structure and the necessity of meeting obligations on fixed-income securities.  
Based on the many risks described above, managers must draw from a group 
of alternatives to quantify the risks they face. Statistical methods and simulation are 
two of the most widely-used approaches to determine risk probabilities and values.   
Statisticians have presented both the absolute and relative measures of risk.  
Absolute measures of dispersion include the range, mean absolute deviation, 
variance, standard deviation, and semi-variance.  The relative measure of dispersion 
is simply the coefficient of variation.   Each measure has a unique equation to 
determine its value.  Additionally, all of these measures present high and low 
benchmarks against which to compare and determine the risk of the investment.    
Once the measures have been computed, a comparison and interpretation 
must be done among all the possible investments and the correlations of the 
measures to determine which alternative is the best overall.  The absolute statistical 
measures provide valuable insight with regards to risk.  Mainly, the relative measure 
of dispersion or coefficient of variation indicates the level of risk per dollar of 
expected return.  Lower coefficients of variation translate into lower risk. 
5. Incorporating Risk into the Capital Budgeting Process 
Not all projects can be treated equally in regards to risk.  Each investment 
project has its unique level and type of risk.  Therefore, to properly incorporate risk 
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 into investment analysis, two methods have been developed.  These two methods 
are the certainty equivalent approach and the risk-adjusted discount rate. 
In the 1980s, the concept of certainty equivalent was described as follows: 
“The certainty equivalent method permits adjustment for risk by incorporating the 
manager’s utility preference for risk versus return directly into the capital investment 
process”   (Clark et al., 1989).   
This concept has remained consistent in its purpose throughout time until the 
present.  Keown et al. (2005) presents a more updated definition: the certainty 
equivalent approach involves a direct attempt to allow the decision-maker to 
incorporate his or her utility function into the analysis.  This approach allows the 
financial manager to substitute a set of equivalent riskless cash flows for the 
expected cash flows.  Subsequently, these cash flows are discounted back to the 
present using the NPV criteria.  Once the calculation is completed, the project with a 
net present value equal to or greater than zero is selected.   While this approach 
accounts for the utility factor, it can be an arbitrary approach.  Two different financial 
managers can look at the same project with different riskless rates.  Therefore, if 
presented with this situation, which of the two managers is correct?  In reality, both 
managers could be right since the riskless measure is based on a relative 
assessment as opposed to a hard factual guideline.   This approach is not widely 
used because of the potential bias that can stem from the “riskless” assessment.  
The next approach is the risk-adjusted discount rate.  The definition used in 
the 1980s was: “The rationale underlying the use of the risk-adjusted discount rate 
(RADR) technique is that projects which have greater variability in the probability 
distributions of their returns should have these returns discounted at a higher rate 
than projects having less variability of risk.” The RADR concept concentrates on the 
variability of risk.  Therefore, it adjusts the discount rate to accommodate greater or 
lesser risk.  Likewise, today’s approach to this method focuses on the same 
principle.  “A method for incorporating the project’s level of risk into the capital-
budgeting process, in which the discount rate is adjusted upward to compensate for 
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 higher than normal risk or downward to adjust for lower than normal risk” (Keown et 
al., 2005).  
The method of risk-adjusted discount rates seems more plausible when 
incorporating risk into capital budgeting for two reasons.  First, financial analysts 
should consider the stakeholders reactions to new investments if the risk associated 
with them is different that the firm’s typical risk.  Second, adjusting the discount rate 
upward or downward accounts for the variability of returns based on risk.  
The most significant difference between the two methods hinges on the point 
at which the adjustment for risk is incorporated into the calculations.  Also, the risk-
adjusted discount rate makes the implicit assumption that risk becomes greater as 
time windows expand. 
Based on the many risks described above, managers must draw from a group 
of alternatives to quantify the risks they face. Statistical methods and simulation are 
two of the most widely-used approaches to determine risk probabilities and values.   
The previous discussion has ignored the role of risk and uncertainty in 
private-sector capital budgeting.  In fact, even when firms use the criteria and 
guidelines detailed above, the cash flows used in their analysis of a capital project 
are only estimates of “what is expected to happen in the future, not necessarily what 
will happen in the future” (Keown et al., 2005).  However, even though private firms 
can not know with 100% certainty what cash flows will result from investing in any 
particular capital project, they can estimate a range of probabilities for the cash 
flows.  Likewise, private firms will have to make estimates on interest rates related to 
their future costs of capital.    
The more common method the private firms use for incorporating risk is 
through risk-adjusted discount rates.  The use of this method is “based on the 
concept that investors demand higher returns for more risky projects” (Keown et al., 
2005).  In this process, the discount rate used in the NPV criterion is adjusted 
upward or downward in accordance with the level of risk inherent in the capital 
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 investment under consideration.  If a capital project is determined to be riskier than 
normal, the discount rate is adjusted upward.  If the level of risk for the project under 
consideration is higher than the firm’s “typical” project, then management must 
assume that the firm’s shareholders will demand a higher rate of return for taking on 
this additional risk.  By appropriately adjusting the discount rates for the risk level of 
the project under consideration, the firm can ensure to the best of their ability across 
a portfolio of projects that their capital budgeting analysis will yield projects that 
increase the profits of the firm and ultimately increase shareholder value (Keown et 
al., 2005).   
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 Reform Options 
This research examined the capital budgeting practices and principles used in 
both public- and private-sector organizations.  The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), President Clinton’s Commission to Study Capital Budgeting (PCSCB), and 
others performed several studies which resulted in several proposed improvements 
to the current system of capital budgeting in the federal government.  
First, if budget reforms are going to be made, management reforms must be 
made simultaneously to ensure the reforms are properly implemented and all 
persons involved are aware and able to make the appropriate changes.  This is 
especially true if one of the reforms is decentralizing the decision-making process.  
Decentralizing the decision-making process could prompt the use of performance 
budgeting, where departments are rated (and rewarded) on their success of 
reaching predetermined goals.  Authority for capital asset purchases could be shifted 
down to the department level (i.e., the DoD would decide which assets to buy) 
instead of Congress holding virtually all decision-making authority.  Even though 
SECDEF Rumsfeld’s request for “broadened discretionary powers” in the Defense 
Transformation Act (DTA) was denied by Congress, his ideas have considerable 
merit since the departments are the most closely involved with the day-to-day 
business they conduct (McCaffery & Jones, 2004).  
Since federal agencies have much tighter constraints than businesses in the 
private sector, it is difficult to provide incentives for agencies to manage their assets. 
However, along with continued use of the Bush Administration’s Performance 
Assessment Rating Tool (PART), Congress could adopt policies similar to Australia 
and New Zealand and allow the agencies, including the DoD, to raise and keep 
revenues from selling or renting out existing assets (President’s Commission to 
Study Capital Budgeting, 1999).  If good PART scores are rewarded in the budget 
process and agencies are allowed to keep revenues from the sale of assets, there 
are at least two incentives for agencies to manage their assets well.  
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 If performance-based budgeting is used, the strategic plans of the 
departments could play a much larger role in the capital budgeting process.  
Although the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires agencies 
to submit five-year strategic plans, the plans are only prepared every three years 
and are currently not used directly in considering appropriation requests, which 
includes requests for capital spending.  If a move towards performance budgeting 
and a more decentralized decision-making process was made, these plans would 
need to have results-oriented goals that could be measured, so that agencies could 
be rated on their performance (possibly via PART).  For the DoD, this would mean 
that the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), DoD version of the agency capital plan, 
would play a larger role in the decision-making process regarding capital asset 
purchases.  Also, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should evaluate the 
plans and Congress should use the strategic plans and OMB evaluation as decision-
making tools when considering appropriation requests.  Taking into account the 
considerable amount of time that most federal agencies spend preparing their 
strategic plans in accordance with GPRA, it seems reasonable to suggest that these 
plans be used for decision-making purposes. 
Additionally, it would be useful for planning purposes if the strategic plans and 
budgets were tied to the lifecycles of the capital assets.  Although the Capital 
Programming Guide directs agencies to consider lifecycle costs and compare them 
to expected benefits, the lifecycle costs are not directly linked to the agency’s 
strategic plans.  If the capital asset’s lifecycle costs were tied to strategic plans, 
funding for the maintenance and replacement of assets could be planned in 
advance.  The plans should also include any future outlays for capital assets that are 
planned (such as land, buildings, and new weapon systems).  If a lifecycle is 
estimated for an asset, then the department would know when it will be necessary to 
replace the item, and this can be included in the plan.  Therefore, even if there is no 
proposal or recommendation for the actual item that will replace the asset, funding 
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 In an effort to assist agencies in making decisions on capital asset 
investments, the agencies should continue to prepare annual financial statements as 
required by the CFO Act.  It should be noted, however, that preparation of financial 
statements simply for CFO compliance should not be the goal.  The goal should be 
preparation of financial statements that are used to aid in better decision making.  In 
addition, the agencies could prepare detailed breakdowns of existing capital assets.  
The information in these reports would then be consolidated by the OMB and used 
to assist the agencies in preparing long-term capital plans, similar to DoD FYDP, as 
well as to assist OMB in reviewing and assessing those plans (President’s 
Commission to Study Capital Budgeting, 1999). 
Most states have separate capital budgets.  Analysis of the case study on 
state capital budgets prompts the question of if there should be a separate capital 
budget at the federal level.  While there are many critics of a separate capital budget 
at the federal government or agency level, there has been a proposal for instituting 
separate capital acquisition funds (CAF) at the agency level.  A segment of the 
agency’s appropriations would be placed in the CAF and could only be used for 
acquiring large capital assets.  The CAF would borrow from the Treasury and charge 
operating units rent equal to the amount of debt service.  Additionally, the CAF 
would inherit all of the agency’s existing capital assets in an effort to capture all 
agency costs of capital.  Separate funds for capital acquisition should help agencies 
better plan and budget for capital assets.  The agencies could then be held 
accountable for planning and budgeting and, presumably, would be more likely to 
use their resources efficiently.  These funds would also smooth out the budget 
authority required by agencies and would help to reduce potential spikes in the 
budget associated with full funding requirements.  An important aspect of introducing 
separate capital acquisition funds, however, is the definition of capital assets.  OMB 
would have to issue guidance on what constitutes a capital asset to ensure 
implementation is consistent throughout the agencies (President’s Commission to 
Study Capital Budgeting, 1999).  
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 While the Government Accountability Office (GAO) originally agreed with and 
supported the President’s Commission to Study Capital Budgeting recommendation 
to implement capital acquisition funds, they have recently published a study stating 
that the proposed benefits of CAFs can be achieved through simpler means (GAO, 
2005).   
The GAO states that CAFs, as a financing mechanism for federal capital 
assets, would ultimately increase management and oversight responsibilities for the 
Treasury Department, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the departments and agencies that would 
utilize CAFs.  While recognizing that CAFs might improve decision-making and 
remove (for the most part) spikes in Budget Authority (BA) associated with large 
dollar capital assets, GAO states that some federal agencies are using different 
approaches that address these problems through much simpler means (GAO, 
2005).   
The federal agencies that the GAO studied are using asset management 
systems which are allowing them to assess the condition of existing capital assets, 
estimate funding levels for maintaining these assets, and assign priorities to 
maintenance and improvements for capital assets.  Other agencies are currently 
using cost information from their accounting systems to assist in the agency’s 
budgeting decisions.  However, additional improvements in agency cost-accounting 
systems is needed before they can fully inform the agency’s capital planning and 
budgeting decisions (GAO, 2005).   
The GAO’s study of several capital-intensive federal agencies, coupled with 
several interviews with officials from Congress, Treasury, and the OMB, has led 
them to conclude that CAFs, as they had been proposed by the President’s 
Commission to Study Capital Budgeting, are too complicated for implementation 
because of the additional budget complexities that they create.  Additionally, 
interviews with executive and congressional officials led the GAO to believe that a 
proposal to institute CAFs, even on a pilot basis, would have few, if any, proponents.  
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 Because of these reasons, the GAO recommends that the focus should be placed 
on improvement and widespread implementation of asset management and cost-
accounting systems to address the problems that CAFs were proposed as a solution 
for (GAO, 2005).   
Spending caps could be placed on capital spending to encourage decision-
makers to set priorities and make tradeoffs, which could result in capital spending 
that provides the most benefit.  This could be done in the context of re-instating the 
Budget Enforcement Act spending caps that have expired.  With spending caps, 
decision-makers would focus resources on achieving the long-term objectives and 
spend capital dollars on the most cost-effective assets (President’s Commission to 
Study Capital Budgeting, 1999), much like what is common practice in private-sector 
organizations.  Agencies will also ensure that capital assets invested in are required 
to accomplish their mission as defined by their strategic plan.  
While spending caps encourage efficient trade-off decisions, when combined 
with the current full-funding requirements, spending caps can lead to a bias against 
capital projects in the budget process.  However, as previously noted, full funding in 
the current budget process is important for controlling acquisition costs and ensuring 
adequate resources to operate and maintain capital assets.  Although there seems 
to be incompatibility between spending caps and full-funding, the GAO has identified 
strategies that have been successfully used by selected agencies to accommodate 
capital spending within the current budget controls imposed by Congress (Posner, 
1998).  These strategies take into account the presumed reluctance of Congress to 
approve separate capital budgets, capital acquisition funds, or decentralized 
decision-making at the agency level.   
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 Conclusions 
The current practices of the DoD and the federal government are clearly less 
than perfect and often lead to capital asset expenditures that are not as efficient or 
as effective as needed.  Obviously, if discretionary dollars continue to be limited, and 
the current budgeting practices are leading to inefficient and ineffective use of capital 
dollars, something needs to change.  Budgeting changes at the federal government 
level would certainly require Congressional and Executive commitment if any 
progress is to be made.  Some of the recommendations require Congress to give 
federal agencies more control of their budgets; and there has been very little 
Congressional interest in sharing their “power of the purse.”  The result has been 
efforts, in the form of laws and regulations, mandating federal agencies to be more 
efficient in their use of resources with an emphasis in becoming more “business-
like.”   
Recent efforts by the DoD and other federal agencies have improved 
conditions to some degree.  Several foreign governments and many states have 
been successful in implementing capital budgeting practices that are prevalent in 
private-sector companies.  Likewise, the DoD and other federal agencies have 
instituted some of these same practices.  However, more progress needs to be 
made.  More research should be done, and serious commitments need to be made 
from Congress and federal agencies to improve the budgeting processes.  Thorough 
examination of private-sector capital budgeting practices in states and other 
countries coupled with proposals made by the PCSCB, the GAO, and others, 
provide valuable insights with respect to changes that should be assessed in terms 
of their application in the Department of Defense.  
In our view, the Department of Defense (and most of the federal government 
for that matter) should adopt and implement capital budgeting. In doing so, the DoD 
probably ought to completely discard PPBES1 and replace it with a long-range and 
accrual-based planning and budgeting process, i.e., ending what we know as 
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 programming and the POM. In effect, programming is only effective at the end-game 
anyway—but preparing and processing the POM wastes huge amounts of valuable 
DoD staff time and energy that can be put to better use. Also, ideally, the period for 
obligation of all accounts in the new DoD budget process would permit obligation 
over a period of two or three years for all accounts—including fast spend accounts 
including O&M, MILPERS, etc. The reason for multiple-year obligation for all 
accounts is to enable more effective budget execution and end the highly wasteful 
and inefficient end-of-year "spend it or lose it" incentive syndrome. This change 
would, of course, require the approval of Congress. However, the DoD could 
implement long-range budgeting (including capital budgeting) as a part of the overall 
reform—while Congress continues to operate on the annual budget cycle it prefers 
(for a number of reasons related to serving constituent and member interests). No 
change in the federal budget process can be made unless it permits Congress to 
continue to do its business according to the incentives faced by members. To think 
otherwise is naïve. Still, as noted above, the only part of the reform advocated here 
that would require explicit congressional action is lengthening the obligation period 
for all accounts to two or three years (as has been done internationally, in the UK 
and other countries, for example). This change would require Congress to modify 
certain provisions of appropriation law. Otherwise, the DoD could implement a long-
range accrual based budgeting system on its own, subject to gaining approval of and 
support for it from Congress—but it would not require change in law. In essence, it is 
incumbent on the DoD to persuade Congress to support the change—and this will 
only occur if the DoD is able to show members how they, the DoD and the American 
taxpayer will be better off as a result of the reform. 
In addition, the defense acquisition decision process is so flawed and 
excessively bureaucratic that it, too, should be replaced completely by a new 
process that would enable capital asset investment analysis of alternatives, decision 
making and execution in a much shorter period of time, involving far fewer 
participants, and in synchronicity with a long-range planning and accrual budgeting 
process that places emphasis on performance rather than input and process 
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 variables. The system, as it operates presently, is an incredible and wasteful triumph 
of process over substance. Also, we wish to observe that if we really want to run the 
DoD like a business (i.e., using smart business practices) the best way to 
accomplish this goal is to make it a business— through increased contracting of all 
essentially non-governmental functions to the private sector. In our view, so much of 
what the DoD acquisition and contracting bureaucracy does (and does badly) could 
and should be performed entirely outside of government. However, full exploration of 
these proposals must and will be made in other papers, the research for which is 
ongoing as we complete writing this document.  
1Some might argue that the MILPERS and O&M accounts should be kept in a modified PPBE-like 
process. We have no problem with this idea, but divorced of capital asset decisions, keeping PPBE 
as a budgeting system seems overly bureaucratic. What system the remaining DoD accounts should 
use is another good topic of inquiry with the basic question being what kind of system serves a set of 
accounts, several of which have been relatively stable -- MILPERS and CIVPERS -- in O&M and 
O&M itself which historically has been relatively stable at the topline, but riddled with within-year 
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